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Department of Defense project managers are increasing
the scope of their operations to include consideration of
foreign defense articles in acquisition strategies. This
action has been motivated primarily by NATO Rationalization,
Standardization and Interoperability (RSI) requirements.
This thesis addresses the problems, real and perceived, in
implementing "two-way street" transactions with allied
nations. Members of U.S. Navy project offices were inter-
viewed to determine the impact of NATO RSI policy on their
operations. The questions asked revealed problems encoun-
tered and highlighted the pro/con biases of foreign acquisi-
tion. Private industry has been active in foreign purchasing
for many years. A survey was utilized to identify private
industry's experiences with foreign business practices,
company biases and economic considerations. The thesis
concludes with a comparison of private and DOD experiences
and offers some recommendations to project managers involved
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In recent years, labels in consumer goods have read like
a United Nations roster. Made in Japan. Made in Israel.
Made in Taiwan. Made in Mexico or Malaysia or Sri Lanka.
Made in one of scores of other emerging and highly indus-
trialized nations. It's hard to remember that prior to the
Korean War the consumer lived in a "Made in America" world.
Beginning in the mid 1950 's, consumers moved quickly from
the imported German Volkswagon "bug" and Japanese camera
and stereo equipments to textiles, plastics, appliances
and to thousands of other "everyday" goods. Today the
American is an international consumer.
United States industry was somewhat more knowledgable
about foreign sources for raw materials and small manufac-
tured items. In some cases, certain commodities were only
available from foreign sources. In other cases, lower labor
costs in the foreign marketplace gave products an economic
advantage over domestic products. Generally, however, U.S.
industry did not look beyond domestic sources to acquire
needed commodities.
The Department of Defense has been a neophyte in inter-
facing with the foreign marketplace. Although active in the
sale of U.S. defense articles to allied nations, little
impetus has been provided to look beyond domestic alternative

weapon systems when adding to the U.S. defense arsenal.
This policy is ingrained in both legal and traditional
practice. Legal constraints, such as the Buy American
Act, have been the law of this country since the early
1930' s. Although enacted in a period when the United
States professed laissez-faire diplomacy, this act and
similar legislation have continued to receive strong support,
particularly from labor unions and certain trade associations,
Department of Defense acquisition managers have probably also
been influenced by the "not invented here" syndrome, the
belief that only systems of U.S. design and manufacture can
meet the demanding performance specifications required of .
U.S. weapon systems.
B. CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
United States industry is becoming increasingly aware
of the advantages of foreign procurements . Lower prices
are no longer the only incentive to buying overseas. Most
buyers continue to "buy American", other things being equal .
It is the other things which are increasing foreign trade!
U.S. buyers have reported that overseas companies are more
willing to meet the buyers' special needs. The foreign
vendors have the needed capabilities or, more importantly,
are willing to adjust manufacturing methods in areas where
U.S. producers are inflexible. In some areas, U.S. indus-
try may be in its infancy in manufacturing certain products
which are readily available now from foreign sources. Some

buyers are becoming "more comfortable with foreign design
and knowledge." [9:35]
The Department of Defense also has had to change acqui-
sition policy to meet growing international considerations.
President Carter emphasized the need for cooperation between
NATO countries at the May, 1977 Summit Meeting in London.
The President stated:
As we strengthen our forces, we should
also improve cooperation in development,
production and procurement of alliance
defense equipment. The alliance should not
be weakened militarily by waste and over-
lapping. Nor should it be weakened polit-
ically by disputes over where to buy
defense equipment.
. . .We must make a major effort--to
eliminate waste and duplication between
national programs; to provide each of our
countries an opportunity to develop,
produce and sell competitive defense
equipment; and to maintain technological
excellence in all allied combat forces ... [2:14]
The Department of Defense reinforced the President's
message by promulgating policy guidance in 1977 to include
NATO Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability
(RSI) goals in new acquisitions. The policy specifies,
in part, that:
(1) It is the policy of the United States
that equipment procured for U.S. forces
stationed in Europe under the terms of the
North Atlantic Treaty should be standard-
ized or at least interoperable with
equipment of other members of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(2) The Department of Defense will actively
seek standardization and interoperability
of weapon systems and equipment within NATO
on a priority basis in order to conserve

resources and increase the combined combat
capability of the U.S. and NATO forces.
(3) The DOD components will include NATO
standardization and interoperability
goals as fundamental considerations in
their development and procurement programs
for both major and minor equipment items
... [8:1-2]
Project managers have been tasked to expand their
operations to include "two-way street" transactions with
allied nations. Instead of just interfacing with these
nations in a seller's role, generally through the completion
of foreign military sales, DOD agencies are now being
challenged with a two-way flow of business. On one hand,
project offices are attempting to meet the reciprocity demands
of allied nations in a manner which enhances standardization
and interoperability goals. At the same time, care must
be exercised to ensure that DOD does not become irreversibly
committed to dependency on foreign sources for certain defense
articles and that an adequate industrial base is maintained
in the United States.
C. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING DOD POLICY
The consideration of foreign defense articles to meet
United States mission requirements is a major challenge for
most project managers. The regulations which govern the
acquisition of domestic articles are constantly changing." It
is difficult enough for government and industrial staffs to
ensure compliance with these regulations, particularly those
that deal with socio-economic requirements. The application
10

of DOD acquisition policy to foreign purchases presents
several new problems. It is probable that many foreign
companies cannot, or will not, agree to the same restric-
tions imposed through domestic acquisition policy.
A certain amount of personal bias is likely to be
encountered within DOD program offices. The superiority of
United States technology has been professed for many years,
particularly since the vast industrial mobilization during
the Second World War. Although allied nations have demon-
strated the capability to produce superior weapons, such as
VSTOL aircraft and small caliber, rapid-fire guns, the
inertia of the "Buy American" philosophy will be difficult
to overcome in implementing new policy directives.
The problems project managers have encountered, or will
encounter, in implementing NATO Rationalization, standardi-
zation and Interoperability policy are the central foci of
this thesis. Since private industry has been in the foreign
marketplace for several more years than the Department of
Defense, its experience also will be investigated in some
detail. A simple cookbook approach to implementing DOD RSI
policy cannot be expected. The unique aspects of each pro-
gram preclude such a simplistic approach to the problems
.
Rather, it is anticipated that, by researching the experi-
ences of a large number of organizations in both government
and industry, some recommendations can be developed which
will assist the project manager in meeting DOD goals.
11

Department of Defense policy regarding international
acquisition of defense articles is in a constantly evolving
state. As major acquisition policy is rewritten, such as
the upcoming revision to DOD Instruction 5000.1 (i.e. Major
System Acquisitions) , the emphasis on foreign acquisition
may be modified. In addition, publication of new procedural
documents (e.g., the Federal Acquisition Regulation) , may
change the applicability of certain regulations to foreign
purchases. It is assumed, however, that the commitment of
this country to greater cooperation with NATO allies will
mandate DOD project managers to consider foreign defense
articles in major acquisitions. It is the goal of this
thesis to help ease the burden of this program implementation,
D. THESIS STRUCTURE
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I pro-
vides an introduction and defines the key problems involved
in implementing NATO RSI policy. Chapter II presents the
environmental background leading to the establishment of this
policy. The research methodology utilized in the thesis is
described in Chapter III. Chapter IV reports the problems
of Navy project offices in implementing the DOD policy on
rationalization, standardization and interoperability. In
order to obtain the experiences of private industry in
purchasing from the international marketplace, several com-
panies were surveyed. The results of this survey are pro-
vided in Chapter V. Chapter VI contrasts the experiences
12

of government and industry in the foreign marketplace and





For many years the American consumer and businessman
have followed the practice of favoring domestically pro-
duced articles over those of foreign manufacture. This
practice is rooted both in legal statute and in custom.
Recent attempts to open up the foreign marketplace for
federal acquisition considerations have encountered much
resistance from both government agencies and government
suppliers.
Although restrictions on foreign trade can probably be
traced back to the beginning of this country's history, the
landmark legislation which has influenced most subsequent
actions was the Buy American Act of 1933. Enacted during a
time when the United States was suffering through a devas-
tating depression, it received wide acceptance from business
groups and consumers. The act allowed a six percent differ-
ential to be added to the price of a foreign good when com-
paring the price with a domestic good. If the price of the
foreign good still was lowest, and the product met the proper
specifications, the federal government agency was allowed
to buy from the foreign source. If not, the domestic good
received preference. This act only applied to federal
agencies, not state or local governments. [10:8]
The Department of Defense took an even more stringent
interpretation of the Buy American Act. With the exception
14

of those goods manufactured in Canada, preference was to
be given to domestic bids except when the foreign good met
the six percent criterion discussed above or when the foreign
bid was cheaper after 50 percent of the bid (exclusive of
duty) was added to the bid price. In this case, the DOD
agency was required to select the percentage which resulted
in the greater evaluated price. A 12 percent factor was
substituted for the 6 percent factor when the bidding domes-
tic firm was a small business or labor surplus area concern.
[4:6-100, 6-104.4] It is easy to see why many DOD procure-
ment agencies tended to not even consider foreign sources
of supply when initiating new procurements
.
Congress has added additional restrictions on foreign
procurement through the annual Defense Appropriation Acts.
Appropriated funds have been withheld from usage to buy
any foreign article of food, clothing, cotton, wool, woven
silk and woven silk blends, spun silk yarn for cartridge
cloth, synthetic fabric or specialty metals. [4: 6-300]
Although Congress has waived the specialty metals provision
in fiscal years 1978 and 1979, significant industry pressure
has been instrumental in keeping the other restrictions in
current defense appropriation acts. Legislation has also
been in effect for several years which prevents the
construction of U.S. ships in foreign shipyards.
The Trade Act passed by Congress in 1974 replaced the
1962 law which favored free-trade. The new act was passed
15

with the strong support of both labor and the U.S. steel
industry. Although the act was passed primarily to give
the President authority to negotiate a new international
trade agreement, it reflected the concern of Congress over
recession and the rising unemployment rate. ' Powerful unions
in the steel, garment, textile and shoe industries, who were
strong supporters of free trade a decade earlier, were
demanding protection from "unfair" foreign competition to
s
save jobs . [13:44]
J
Although several industries have been impacted by imports
of cheaper products manufactured overseas, the steel industry
has been particularly affected. Modern Japanese steel plants
are capable of manufacturing twice the amount of steel
required for their domestic requirements. Government inter-
vention in Japan has been a particularly sore point with
many U.S. steel officials. Mr. A. A. Monnett, Jr., Vice
President of the United States Steel Corporation, expressed
his views of the problem in a recent speech. He stated,
"My point is that government management of steel in Japan
has so grossly distorted conditions of competition with U.S.
producers (who normally operate in a private market system)
that the traditional basis for formulating trade policy no
longer applies to such sectors of industry. These sectors,
which are capital-intensive or labor-intensive or both, can
be ruined by the unrestricted operation of foreign government-
managed industry in our markets." [12:463]
16

The "protectionist" mood in the United States is cer-
tainly not unilateral in nature. Foreign government
"intervention" in key industries has been cited by both
labor and industry in the United States as unfair restraints
on free trade. In several countries, "non-tariff barriers
to trade" (NTB's) are replacing explicit tariffs. These
NTB's have taken the form of industrial subsidies, employ-
ment subsidies, discriminatory government procurement prac-
tices, safety standards, "voluntary" export quotas and
orderly marketing agreements . The dangers attributed to
use of NTB's, as opposed to specific tariffs, are that they
are frequently hidden barriers to trade and that they do
not explicitly discriminate between the domestic and foreign
sectors of the economy. [11:41]
B. NATO RSI CONSIDERATIONS
In the environment of increased "protectionist" legis-
lation discussed above, the Department of Defense has been
mandated to consider acquisition of foreign defense articles
for use by U.S. Armed Forces, particularly those units
operating with the NATO defense forces. The major impetus
behind an increased awareness of allied nation capabilities
is the NATO Rationalization, Standardization and Inter-
operability (RSI) program. At the May, 1977 Summit Meeting
in London, President Carter emphasized the need for improved
cooperation by NATO countries in development, production and
procurement of alliance defense equipment. He stated that:
17

(1) the United States must be willing to
promote genuine two-way transatlantic
trade in defense equipment
(2) he had instructed the Secretary of
Defense to seek increased opportunities
to buy European defense equipment where
this would mean more efficient use of
Allied resources
(3) he would work with Congress to this
[the above] end. [15:419]
In a prepared statement, Doctor William J. Perry,
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,
summarized DOD policy to the House Committee on Appropri-
ations as follows
:
We intend to promote, to the maximum
extent practical, cooperative material
programs with our Allies .. .particularly
NATO countries ... in order to further our
mutual economic interests and common
defense needs. [15:413]
Before current DOD efforts to increase NATO cooperation
can be reviewed, a definition of the terms involved would
be appropriate. There has been considerable disagreement
within NATO as to the specific meanings of rationalization,
standardization and interoperability. A State Department
official, in recent congressional testimony, defined them
as follows:
Rationalization is the "umbrella term"
used to describe any action which makes
more rational use of our defense resources
both as individual nations and collectively.
This includes a better and more efficient
division of tasks or at least compati-
bility of equipment among allied forces . .
.
We use standardization to cover the
adoption of common equipment, doctrine,
and procedures among various members of
the Alliance. This is the most difficult
18

element of rationalization to achieve,
and the most misunderstood concept.
Essentially standardization is a long-
term undertaking. It starts with
coordinated research and development
and a common perception of the future
threat together with an agreed approach
to how to deal with it ...
The term interoperability is used to
describe those steps taken to make
different equipment more compatible.
This includes interchangeable parts and
consumables, such as fuel and ammunition,
and the ability to cross-service between
forces. [14:36]
These definitions are consistent with the DOD programs
researched in this thesis.
Department of Defense project offices are monitored on
their compliance with NATO RSI goals through the formal
milestone evaluations conducted by the Defense System
Acquisition Review Councils (DSARC's) and the appropriate
service Acquisition Review Councils (e.g., DNSARC's for
Navy projects) . Among the issues investigated at these
reviews are allied research and development programs, com-
patibility of the threat assessment with the NATO threat
assessment and the review of potential or existing NATO
candidate systems which may be available for United States
use. [7:2]
The Department of Defense has singled out investigation
of foreign research and development advances as a prime means
of attaining increased standardization with NATO allies.
Utilization of foreign R&D will allow the United States to
conserve its own research and development dollars while
19

capitalizing on significant advancements made by other NATO
countries in new weapon systems development. Cooperative
military and related commercial ventures between U.S. com-
panies and overseas companies are seen by DOD as a means to
reduce acquisition cost and improve the industrial and mili-
tary capabilities of the NATO alliance. [15:413] The recent
success with such systems as the French-German designed
ROLAND II air defense missile system and the United Kingdom
designed F-8A Harrier aircraft attest to the feasibility of
introducing foreign designed systems into the U.S. defense
inventory
.
NATO standardization is by no means an easy program to
implement. The significant difference in size between the
U.S. industrial capability as opposed to the combined capa-
bility of NATO countries makes a fair balance of weapon sys-
tem development and production difficult. In 1976, NATO
countries expended approximately 16 billion dollars on
defense equipment, four billion dollars of which was pro-
duced in West Germany. A large portion of the remainder
was spent for U.S. equipment (FMS sales). In size, European
defense industry is small, approximately one-tenth the size
of the U.S. defense industry. [16:215]
There is not total agreement on the benefits to be
accrued from NATO RSI. One industry spokesman, speaking
for the Electronic Industries Association, summed up an
opposing viewpoint as follows:
20

"The administration had adapted an
approach which
(1) acquiesces to politico-economic
pressure from our European allies;
(2) fails to account for the vast
difference in Government-industry
relations abroad;
(3) fails to recognize the impact
of third country sales; and
(4) most importantly, appears to be
placing new equipment development deci-
sions in the hands of NATO bureaucrats
who will decide who will develop what
not on the basis of NATO mission-need
but on the basis of everyone having a slice
of the Defense pie." [1:48]
C. RECIPROCITY AGREEMENTS
Many allied nations now are insisting on reciprocity
agreements in return for purchase of U.S. defense systems.
These agreements enable the foreign governments to recoup
a portion of their investments through the reciprocal pur-
chase by the United States of foreign produced defense or
domestic articles. The two most common methods utilized
to establish reciprocal agreements are Memoranda of
Understanding (MOU's) and procurement offset agreements.
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU's) establish agreements
between two or more countries to work toward an equitable
equilibrium of purchases on defense programs . No specific
goals are defined. Instead, the signatories to the memorandum
agree to cooperate in areas such as configuration management,
technical support and supply support. In administering these
memoranda, DOD agencies are deeply involved in joint discussions
with allied nations regarding mutual problems in research
and development, production and procurement. The goal of
21

the agreements is to achieve greater military capability at
the lowest possible cost through a more rational use of the
industrial, economic and technical resources of each country.
[15:44] The United States currently has reciprocal procure-
ment agreements with Canada, France, Norway and the United
Kingdom. [6:1] Pending agreements are being negotiated with
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. The participation of
the countries involved varies with each program.
Offset agreements have more potential impact on DOD
than the Memorandum of Understanding. These agreements call
for specific percentage of sales offsets in return for the
purchase by a foreign government of a U.S. weapons system.
Although offsets can be met in a variety of ways, the most
common methods used are coproduction of selected components
overseas or direct purchase of foreign components for use in
the United States. These purchased components can be either
defense or non-defense related.
The prime contractor benefitting from the sale of defense
equipment and components overseas has the initial burden to
meet specific offset objectives. Most U.S. defense indus-
tries have made genuine efforts to meet these commitments
.
Since foreign military sales, particularly of weapon systems
which are concurrently being produced for United States
military use, are spread over a multiple year time frame; the
prime contractors have adequate time to evaluate and accept
foreign components. They have effectively utilized foreign
22

components in both defense and non-defense configurations.
Some companies, such as the Northrup Corporation, have
established divisions within their marketing organizations
to promote reciprocal purchases from companies in countries
with offset agreements.
The responsibility for meeting offset targets falls
back on the Department of Defense when the prime contractor
fails to meet offset objectives for the foreign country.
This obligation has caused a recent policy clarification by
the Secretary of Defense regarding compensatory coproduction
and offset agreements. The policy statement discourages
the establishment of offset agreements. Any further agree-
ments must be considered on a case-by-case basis, giving due
consideration to related U.S. objectives such as standardi-
zation and interoperability. The Deputy Secretary of Defense
has the authority to approve new offset agreements. [5:2]
Under offset and MOU policy, the Department of Defense
generally attempts to allow foreign firms to bid competi-
tively on government furnished equipments (GFE) on the same
terms as U.S. companies. This policy requires the waiver of
certain U.S. statuatory provisions such as the Buy American
Act and specific Defense Acquisition Regulation (formerly
the Armed Services Procurement Regulation) clauses. The
President and Congress have supported these waivers, particu-
larly when NATO countries were involved. In the FY 1978-1979
Department of Defense Appropriation Acts, Congress authorized
23

a waiver of the Berry Amendment restriction against U.S
purchase abroad of specialty metals when the purchases





The initial thrust of research for this thesis centered
around the subject of foreign military sales (FMS) . This
subject was selected for two reasons. First, the author
had recently obtained considerable experience in the area
with the Navy International Logistics Control Office (NAVILCO)
Second, foreign military sales problems were receiving
high visibility within the Department of Defense.
A search of the articles published in DOD journals and
of reports sponsored by the Department of Defense revealed
an emerging problem of even more potential impact, the
acquisition of foreign defense articles. Although the com-
parison is not exactly precise, the problem can be treated
essentially as "FMS in reverse." The recent emphasis by
the President and by the Department of Defense on NATO
Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability (RSI)
has significant implications for the project manager and
members of his staff.
A limited amount of literature was available documenting
the efforts of the three military services in implementing
NATO RSI policy. The Army had established an office, the
Department of the Army International Rationalization Office
(DAIRO) , which was in the process of conducting studies
into the problem. The Air Force had investigated the methods
available to meet reciprocity agreements with NATO countries
25

buying the F-16 fighter aircraft and other U.S. weapons
systems. The problems anticipated for the project manager
in implementing this policy, however, had not been inves-
tigated in any great depth.
Since private industry has been contracting with foreign
companies for several years, it appeared that valuable
lessons learned might be transferrable to DOD project mana-
gers. An extensive search into commercial periodicals was
conducted to identify the problems industry had encountered
in doing business overseas. This search proved to be
invaluable in structuring questions for subsequent interviews
and surveys
.
B. PERSONAL INTERVIEWS WITH PRIVATE INDUSTRY
The literature search identified several problem areas
which complicated interfacing with overseas companies. These
included differences in business practices, legal constraints,
and personal biases toward overseas acquisition. In order
to identify the most important areas of concern, interviews
were conducted with representatives of several companies.
Initially, due to their proximity to the U.S. Naval Post-
graduate School, companies in the San Jose area were visited.
These visits proved invaluable in structuring a list of
questions which would be used on subsequent interviews.
Although an attempt was made to select companies which con-
tracted with the Department of Defense, this factor was not




Major defense contractors were the next focus of the
research. Since these companies have the prime responsi-
bility to meet foreign reciprocity commitments , the ques-
tions were designed to draw out problems which they had
encountered both overseas and from within the Department
of Defense. Particular attention was focused on identifying
biases against foreign acquisition. In order to obtain candid
responses, the interviewees were assured that their names
would not be revealed in the thesis. All sensitive remarks
used would not be attributable to any person or company.
The personal interviews with representatives of major
defense industries were conducted over a four month period.
During this period, the emphasis of the research was revised
several times. Early questions were designed to identify
biases, both real and perceived, from within DOD or the
companies. Later research emphasized overseas business
practices and economic considerations in foreign acquisitions.
Therefore, the same questions were not asked of each interviewee.
C. PERSONAL INTERVIEWS WITHIN DOD
The major document used as a baseline for questions to
members of Department of Defense agencies was DOD Directive
2010.6. This document provides policy guidance and responsi-
bilities for implementing NATO RSI requirements within DOD.
A series of questions was developed to identify problems
within project offices and other DOD agencies in implementing
this policy. Since it was anticipated that many of the
27

agencies visited would have had limited interface with
foreign companies, these questions were designed to bring
out both real and perceived problems . The questions were
asked via personal interview. Respondents were again
promised anonymity in their responses to sensitive
questions
.
Navy project offices were the focal point of this phase
of the thesis research. An attempt was made to interview
either the project manager or his deputy. Due to their
experiences with foreign customers, the FMS coordinator was
often tasked to respond to the questions. Navy laboratories
were also visited to obtain the research implications of
increased foreign acquisitions.
A few Army and Air Force offices in the Washington, D.C.,
area were visited to assess the progress being made in NATO
RSI by other services. The Congressional perspective was
also obtained in an interview with a staff member of the
House Armed Services Committee.
D. SURVEY TO PRIVATE INDUSTRY
The experiences of DOD agencies with foreign acquisition
was found to be somewhat limited. Therefore, it was difficult
to assess what problems might be encountered when NATO RSI
programs were fully implemented. In order to strengthen the
data base upon which thesis recommendations could be developed,





A new survey was developed which emphasized the problems
private industry might expect to encounter in the foreign
marketplace. Any reference to interface with DOD agencies
was removed. Foreign business practices, company biases
and economic considerations were emphasized.
The survey was mailed to sixty companies nationwide.
These companies were selected from the corporate listings in
the Dun and Bradstreet Million Dollar Directory. No particu-
lar product classification was emphasized in choosing the
companies for the survey. Rather, an attempt was made to
select known companies producing a wide range of products.
Although the size of the companies chosen presupposed a
certain amount of overseas purchasing, this was not a pre-
requisite for selection.
The responses to this survey form the substance of one
chapter of this thesis. Since private industry has been
purchasing goods in the foreign marketplace considerably
longer than the Department of Defense, its experiences can
be invaluable in implementing NATO RSI policy. The lessons
learned by private industry, together with the experiences
of certain DOD agencies in doing business overseas, should
be helpful to the new project manager. It is these experi-
ences which form the substance for the conclusions and
recommendations provided in the summary.
29

IV. FOREIGN ACQUISITION AND THE PROJECT MANAGER
A. GENERAL
The increased acquisition of defense articles from the
foreign marketplace has a significant effect on the manage-
ment of a project office. Extra controls must be established
to ensure that components manufactured overseas do in fact
meet rigid cost, schedule and performance specifications.
In addition, it is probable that certain biases against
foreign procurement exist within Department of Defense
staffs. These biases may be based on past difficulties with
foreign weapons systems or may be the manifestation of
unfounded beliefs (e.g., the not-invented-here syndrome).
A survey was conducted in ten different Navy project
offices to evaluate the problems encountered in implementing
the new Department of Defense NATO RSI policy. The offices
were selected based on past experiences with foreign acquisi-
tion and on potential interface with overseas businesses.
In most cases, foreign military sales of U.S. defense sys-
tems were being managed by the project offices selected. A
series of nine questions were employed. The questions were
designed to reveal either problems encountered in the foreign
marketplace or to highlight the pro/con biases of foreign
acquisition. In order to obtain candid responses to the
questions, respondents were assured that their names and
respective project offices would not be identified in the
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research paper. The questions were asked of accountable
personnel within the organization — the project manager,
deputy project manager or FMS coordinator. Two Navy
laboratories were also visited to assess any problems or
biases associated with acceptance of foreign weapon systems.
Appendix A is a list of the questions asked during this
survey.
B. SURVEY RESPONSES
The Department of Defense provided clear NATO standard-
ization and interoperability guidance to the services in
DOD Directive 2010.6 of March 11, 1977. This directive
specified the actions required by appropriate DOD offices
to promote standardization and interoperability of weapon
systems within the NATO alliance. The project office
officials visited were asked what actions had been taken
to implement this DOD directive.
With two exceptions, the personnel queried were aware
of the directive. Unawareness should not be interpreted
as a laxity on the part of any of the project offices in
implementing DOD policy. It probably was due to the unavail-
ability to the researcher of the appropriate level managers
in those project offices. The general consensus of those
interviewed was that the directive had had little impact
on their project.
Two of the project offices visited were responsible
for the acquisition of weapon systems which were of foreign
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origination. One system, the Italian-designed Oto Melara
gun, is now being produced under licensing agreement in the
United States. The other, the British-designed Harrier
aircraft, is being contemplated for model "B" production in
this country. Both projects had been well established when
the NATO standardization and interoperability directive was
promulgated. The management of these offices felt that many
of the actions defined in the DOD directive to promote
acquisition of overseas systems had been met in their projects
Most of the other respondents felt that the intent of
DOD Directive 2010.6 was not applicable to their projects.
One reason cited was the sophistication of the weapon system
being managed. The feeling was that the United States was
advancing the state-of-the-art in the particular warfare
area and that European technology had nothing more sophis-
ticated to offer. Other reasons cited for non-applicability
of the directive was the small size of the program; that is,
the number of weapon systems being developed and the
intelligence implications of the project which the program
people felt precluded allied participation.
Representatives of the U.S. Navy laboratories who were
interviewed felt that the labs must routinely keep abreast
of foreign research and development programs. This practice
not only prevents "rediscovering the wheel" at the labora-
tories, but also allows for considerable savings of research
and development dollars . The impression conveyed by the
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respondents was that scientific knowledge was freely exchanged
with allied nations during preliminary research efforts.
Two of the project offices visited, the Anti-Ship
Missile Defense (ASMD) office and the Patrol Hydrofoil (PHM)
office, were involved in joint development efforts with NATO
countries. Although West Germany and Italy are no longer
participating in the procurement of the PHM, the ship is
being built to metric specifications and is equipped with
foreign components. West Germany and Italy dropped out of
the PHM project after a high-risk assessment of their further
involvement. Their assessment was based primarily on the
fact that the White House and Congress were not adequately
supporting the U.S. role in the PHM development. German
financial support during full-scale engineering development
has enabled the ASMD project to continue, despite reduced
funding by the United States government. Both projects are
good examples of how cooperation with allied nations has
been effective in promoting and continuing development of
a weapons program.
1. Cost, Schedule and Performance Considerations
The project offices were queried regarding the
capability of foreign companies to meet the cost, schedule
and performance criteria the United States requires.
Generally, respondents felt that, with proper controls,
foreign companies could be held to the same standards as
those expected from U.S. companies. A problem could arise
33

in foreign production from the non-acceptance of such U.S.
management controls as on-site auditors and U.S. government-
established cost accounting standards.
Four important problems in doing business with
foreign governments and companies were highlighted by the
deputy project manager of one program:
/ a. Communication was a major problem. Although
the countries speak the same language, extreme care must
be exercised to ensure that descriptions in official
documentation are interpreted the same by participants from
both countries. This problem would certainly be magnified
if different languages and interpretations were involved
in inter-country agreements.
•J b. Differences in support concepts between the
United States and the foreign government may have signifi-
cant impact on the management of a program. In the case
of this system, the foreign country relied heavily on
contractor maintenance support. The United States Navy
planned on support from government-owned intermediate
maintenance activities. This difference in support concepts
required closer scrutiny by the project office staff to
ensure publications reflect the proper maintenance procedures
J c. Another problem Identified by the deputy project
manager was data management. The foreign government agreed
to provide all the data it owned on the system to the United
States. The differences in management policy of the two
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countries created a problem. That government did not
routinely buy development data on weapons systems from
contractors, while the United States does follow this
"total information" practice. The United States conse-
quently encountered some difficulty in obtaining all the
data it routinely requires of a domestically originated
project.
1/ d. It is important that the members of the project
office clearly understand the waivers which apply to the
purchase of a foreign weapon system. In most cases, Buy
American provisions are routinely waived if NATO countries
are involved. However, it is possible that other contractual
requirements are also waiverable (e.g., DAR small business
and EEO specifications) . The project manager and his
staff must become very knowledgeable concerning the waivers,
which apply to their program.
Performance requirements of the foreign system
were interpreted by most respondents as being no different
than those imposed on U.S. produced equipments. Although
there appeared to be some difficulty in imposing "hard"
numbers on foreign manufacturers for requirements such as
mean-time-between- failure (MTBF) and mean-time-to-repair
(MTTR) , no relaxation of applicable specifications could be
accepted. No variance in the strict adherence to specifica-




The survey attempted to identify any specific group
within the DOD community which might exhibit bias against
overseas procurement. The responses varied depending on
whether or not a project was currently involved in acquiring
a foreign defense system.
The fleet users of both the Oto Melara gun and the
Harrier aircraft generally supported their systems. The
Italian produced gun had successfully completed tests in the
laboratory and on board ship. Spare part support for the
gun was considered excellent, but part of this success might
be attributable to the availability of a greater range and
depth of spares during the early test phases. The Aviation
Supply Office, Philadelphia, reported a better percentage of
"fills" for spare part requests for the Harrier aircraft
than for many domestic aircraft systems.
The general attitude of respondents in those project
offices not involved in foreign acquisition was that the
major objection to acquiring foreign systems would probably
come from the appropriate material commands . . . NAVAIR,
NAVSEA, etc.
3 . Sole Sourcing
The prime contractors involved in FMS have frequently
been in a "sole source" situation when doing business with
allied governments. This survey postulated the situation
where the United States would be dependent on an overseas
business as a "sole source" for spare part support of
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certain components. The respondents were asked whether
a U.S. source of supply must be developed to ensure proper
support.
Under the family-of-weapons concept, this scenario
of foreign "sole source" support is a distinct possibility.
In order to take advantage of the economies of scale in
production, the NATO nations have examined the situation
where each country in the alliance "agrees to take respon-
sibility for a given weapon in the family and all other
countries agree to buy that weapon from the single manufac-
turer." [6:421] The assumption is made here that spare
part support for that weapon or associated equipments would
also be the responsibility of that manufacturer.
The project offices surveyed generally were not in
favor of a dependency on overseas sources for spare part
.support. It is significant to note that many systems of
foreign design currently in the defense inventory, such as
the Oto Melara gun, are being manufactured in the United
States under licensing agreements. It is planned that full
spare parts support for the gun will come from the U.S. manu-
facturer, not from Italy. More complex systems, such as the
Harrier aircraft, will still require some overseas support.
For one thing, the Harrier engines are made by Rolls Royce
.
The new model "B" Harrier, however, will be built in the




A variety of methods are being utilized by the
Department of Defense to facilitate support for equipments
of foreign design. Under normal DOD policy, the government
buys the data packages associated with each system, regardless
of whether the system is of domestic or foreign origin.
This gives the government a fallback position should support
problems of any kind be experienced with the manufacturer.
It also allows alternative domestic sources of supply to be
developed. Several respondents in project offices which
manage weapon systems or components of foreign manufacture
indicated that overseas companies were encouraged to estab-
lish support facilities in the United States. Also, if
supplies must be shipped from overseas, greater depth was
being ordered by the inventory control points.
One respondent looked upon development of overseas
sources of supply as a very healthy practice. In this
case, he was referring to components which were now being
produced on a "sole source" basis in this country. Expansion
of sourcing overseas would give the domestic company price
competition and would also make both sources more likely
to respond to DOD needs.
4 . Performance and Quality Assurance
The ability of overseas manufacturers to meet perform-
ance criteria was investigated. As mentioned earlier in
this thesis, the Department of Defense has the mechanism to
fully test the foreign weapon systems during acceptance
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trials and operational evaluation. Most respondents did
not feel that foreign companies would have difficulty meeting
performance specifications. One interviewee was somewhat
concerned that there was no organization, such as the
Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS) or a govern-
ment plant representative in most overseas companies. He
felt that this would preclude early identification of and
earlier corrective action in problem areas . Problem iden-
tification and correction initiatives at the time of govern-
ment testing could be more costly and could cause longer
delays in delivering a weapon system.
A quality assurance function is included in the
mission of the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA)
.
This agency encourages standardized quality assurance pro-
cedures and policies within the NATO nations. Government
personnel of member countries provide services , free of
charge, on a mutual cooperation basis. NAMSA deals directly
with contractors of NATO nations in establishing on-site
quality assurance services. [3:64]
5 . Cooperative Research and Development
Cooperative or interdependent research and develop-
ment programs between the United States and allied nations
are considered essential by the Department of Defense to
achieve standardization and interoperability goals . The
members of the project offices visited were asked whether




Most of those responding were in favor of taking
advantage of allied research and development efforts,
particularly where they were advancing the state-of-the-art
faster than U.S. efforts. In certain areas, such as the
Vertical Short Range Take Off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft
and small caliber gun mounts, most of the technological
breakthroughs had come from European countries . There was
a general feeling among the interviewees, however, that allied
cooperative research and development projects would be
essentially a one-way street. The United States was too
advanced in most technological disciplines to have much
to gain from these research and development exchanges.
There was also concern over the willingness of U.S.
companies to share "proprietary" information with companies
of allied nations. The U.S. government's practice of doing
business at "arms length" with U.S. companies gives them no
real leverage in embarking on joint research and development
projects with allied nations. In European countries, this
was seen as no real problem due to the closer working rela-
tionships between government and industry
.
6. Overseas Subcontracting
The survey participants were asked what the reaction
of their prime contractor would be to subcontracting with
overseas companies. Since "Buy American" provisions were
almost routinely waived on those projects doing business in
NATO countries, there was a greater motivation by U.S.
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defense industries to evaluate the foreign business alter-
natives. In most cases, it appeared that U.S. companies
were buying components overseas when the cost and quality
were favorable. The company generally retained the capa-
bility, however, to manufacture the component in-house or
to buy it from a domestic supplier. Since the overseas
manufactured components would probably carry the prime
contractor's nameplate when installed in the final product,
it was unlikely that fleet users could tell the difference
between foreign and domestically produced components
.
A prime contractor for one of the project offices
was very reluctant to subcontract manufacture of any com-
ponents, regardless of whether they were made in the domestic
or foreign marketplace. In order to prevent the possibility
of subcontracting, the data packages were structured in
such a way that only the prime contractor could build the
components. Fortunately, this was an exception to most
prime contractor practices.
7. Foreign Component Cost
Many of the recent publications regarding commer-
cial industry's experience with the foreign marketplace
cite cheaper costs as an incentive for offshore procurement.
The survey participants were asked about their perception
of foreign component costs
.
Most felt that acquisition costs were cheaper, but
that life cycle costs would tend to be more expensive.
Costs varied from country to country and were dependent on
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whether companies were labor or capital intensive. Labor
costs were generally perceived to be higher in countries
such as Great Britain and West Germany and lower in Italy.
Many European countries were able to compete very success-
fully with U.S. industry due to acquisition of new capital
equipment after World War II.
One respondent indicated that, on occasion, it may
be advantageous for a prime contractor to pay higher costs
for foreign produced components. In their overseas marketing
efforts , some companies may be able to generate more sales
for their weapon systems by offering to purchase a certain
percentage of the components from businesses in the foreign
country. Some of these components may eventually be installed
in U.S. ships or aircraft. Since the U.S. will not be
expected to pay the higher costs of the foreign components,
the costs must be borne by the prime contractor. He normally
does this by burying the costs in overhead, getting the
foreign government to pay extra costs or making less profit.
The respondent emphasized the need for adequate controls
in the project office to control these costs.
8 . Congressional Reaction
The final question asked in the survey was whether
Congressional pressure from constituents may impede effective
implementation of DOD NATO standardization and interopera-
bility policy. Most respondents felt that some pressure
was inevitable, particularly when local companies in a
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congressman's district lost contracts to overseas companies.
More resistance was expected from members of the House of
Representatives rather than the Senate due to closer ties
with constituent businesses. In fact, as reported earlier,
it was primarily the action of the Senate, not the House
of Representatives, which allowed waiver of the specialty
metals restriction in the Berry Amendment for the FY 1978
and FY 1979 defense appropriations.
C. SYNOPSIS
The survey revealed several areas which require additional
management attention if U.S. Navy project offices are to
successfully complete transactions with foreign governments
and industry. The perception of many interviewed was that
business would continue as before, even though overseas
components were being purchased for U.S. weapon systems.
The experiences of the few project offices which have
acquired foreign defense articles reveals that, on the
contrary, significant differences do exist when doing business
overseas
.
As the Department of Defense becomes more involved in
efforts to improve the standardization and interoperability
of NATO weapon systems , care must be exercised to ensure
that project office staffs are familiar with the vagaries
of doing business with foreign suppliers. Personal bias
and ignorance of overseas business practices must not be





V. FOREIGN ACQUISITION IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY
A. GENERAL
The factors motivating private industry to purchase
goods and services from the foreign marketplace would appear
to be quite different than Department of Defense considera-
tions. Unlike DOD, the profit motive must be somewhere near
the top of private industry's priorities when weighing the
pros and cons of offshore purchasing. The cheaper labor
and material prices available overseas, particularly several
years ago when the U.S. dollar was much stronger, probably
were the primary motivating factors in foreign purchasing
decisions.
Private industry was not constrained by the same
statuatory regulations which impacted the government in
major acquisition decisions. Companies which were predom-
inantly involved in the manufacture of defense articles for
DOD did not rule out foreign products, even though Buy
American regulations and provisions of the defense appro-
priation acts restricted their freedom to utilize these
markets. Large volume business and product diversification
allowed them to apply the law of comparative advantage when
evaluating foreign sources. As one aerospace company execu-
tive expressed in a recent interview, the company simply
must go to the source with the best price for the required
quality. The fact that that source is overseas should not
bar its consideration as a supplier.
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Since private industry has considerable experience in
overseas acquisition, it appeared that insight could be
gained by collecting data on this experience. A series of
eight questions was formulated to identify problem areas
in foreign purchasing. The survey questions allowed company
purchasing managers to comment on their policies to purchase
or not to purchase overseas. The survey was mailed to sixty
companies nationwide. Appendix B is a list of the questions
asked during this survey.
The remainder of this chapter summarizes the responses
to the survey. Although over 46 percent of the companies
returned the survey, the questions asked were of the essay
type and precluded analysis on a strictly quantitative
basis. The companies provided valuable qualitative informa-
tion in their replies. These replies form the basis for the
discussion which follows.
B. SURVEY RESPONSES
The companies were asked whether they consider purchase
of components from overseas businesses. Three of the
respondents indicated that it was their company policy not
to purchase overseas. No specific reasons were given for
this policy
.
The remaining twenty-five companies indicated that
foreign sources were utilized, to some extent, in their
purchasing actions. The percentage of offshore purchases
seemed to be a function of the products manufactured by the
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companies. Price, quality and delivery were the major
factors considered in buying overseas. Contrary to the
experiences of U.S. firms approximately ten years ago, price
was no longer the prime reason cited for buying from over-
seas companies. Most respondents listed either quality or
delivery considerations first, with price generally relegated
to the third position on their priority list.
1. Reasons For Buying Foreign
One manufacturer of close-tolerance machine parts
responded that all competent sources are considered, whether
they are foreign or domestic. In the case of foreign
suppliers, however, the respondent emphasized the absolute
essentiality of reviewing specifications in depth with
engineering, quality control and manufacturing personnel
at the prospective overseas source. Any final commitments
are withheld until all parties have an understanding of
the quality and delivery requirements.
The reasons cited for buying from foreign sources
were almost as numerous as the number of respondents to the
survey. A few of the more significant responses are listed
below:
— Reliability and financial strength of the
supplier
— Ease of communications, both written and oral
— Non-availability of material in the domestic
market
— Technological leadership of the supplier
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— Secondary source to cover potential dis-
ruption at a domestic source due to a
strike or shortage of raw materials
— Efforts to gain a prestige advantage
(e.g., Italian lace, British woolens)
-- Customer specified foreign component
— Insight' into unique products, materials,
components and equipment
One company specified price as the major considera-
tion in doing business overseas, except when dealing with
several Communist bloc countries. If the company ascer-
tained that there was a market for their products in these
countries, they would accept a commodity exported by that
country as partial or full payment for the sale. Price
would be sacrificed to enhance entry, or continuance, in
these markets. In this case, foreign purchasing is used as
a marketing tool, much as in DOD offset agreements..
The prime reasons cited for not buying from foreign
companies generally evolved out of specific U.S. customer
requirements. If the customer was the U.S. government, the
Buy American Act frequently caused the foreign price, including
the percentage differential, to be prohibitive. Some cus-
tomers simply required that all components in the finished
product be of domestic origin.
2 . Internal Company Resistance
Resistance to importation of foreign products was
the next area investigated in the survey. It was antici-
pated that some of the "Buy American" preference exhibited
by personnel of the companies in their personal buying
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habits would also influence their reaction to purchase of
foreign components by their companies- The survey partici-
pants were asked which, if any, departments within their
companies expressed the most resistance to offshore procure-
ment. If these companies were now buying foreign components,
they were asked to describe how this resistance was overcome.
A few companies responded that no internal resistance
had been encountered when offshore purchasing was proposed
as an alternative source of components. In many companies,
however, the engineering and quality assurance personnel
seemed to raise the most objections. Frequently, these
objections were due to the lack of previous exposure to
overseas company capabilities. The resistance was overcome
by permitting the engineering and quality assurance personnel
to test the product. In many cases, the product was equal
or better than similar items purchased on the domestic market,
One company overcame resistance from these two departments
when the responsiveness of foreign companies to design change
requests was demonstrated.
Due to the distance factor between the United States
and overseas companies, some respondents indicated that their
production departments were concerned about the possible
disruption of production lines when shipments were delayed.
The actual experience with overseas companies in meeting
shipment dates has generally been good. Most companies
surveyed adopted a practice of increasing the depth of
certain foreign-produced components (i.e., additional safety
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stock levels) to guard against the possibility of unusual
disruptions (e.g., shipping strikes, impoundment by U.S.
customs, etc. )
.
A manufacturer of low-cost domestic products encoun-
tered an interesting conflict between the quality control
department and the marketing department when the purchase of
foreign products was considered. The quality control per-
sonnel felt that the quality level of products from over-
seas did not match domestic quality. Marketing was having
difficulty selling certain product lines due to the price
which was required to be charged to cover costs of domestic
components. In this instance, management sacrificed some
quality to take advantage of the cheaper overseas sources.
Although this practice might work for cheap, disposable items,
it would probably lead to disaster for the manufacturers of
more complex products.
One respondent from a company that markets high-
quality athletic goods replied that the marketing department
had expressed the most resistance to purchase of overseas
components. The company had built its reputation as a
market leader in the production of durable products. Marketing
personnel feared that the addition of even a few minor
foreign-produced components would "cheapen" the product in
the eyes of the consumer and impact sales. The company
does buy foreign components today, but is careful to ensure
that their labels, not those of a foreign company, are
affixed to the end products.
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3. Overseas Purchasing Experiences
The companies surveyed were divided in their early-
experiences in buying from a foreign source. Eight companies
indicated that they had no unique problems in commencing
overseas purchases. In essence, their overseas experiences
were no different than those encountered when establishing
a new domestic source.
One small machinery manufacturer had such bad
experiences with the quality of foreign produced die castings
that it ceased doing any overseas business after eighteen
months. It has now reassessed several foreign producers'
capabilities and has had good experiences in the overseas
marketplace.
Most of the other respondents reported that communi-
cation caused major problems in early contacts with foreign
businesses. This applied to both written and oral communi-
cation. The clear understanding of specifications by the
foreign vendor usually took a long time to accomplish. One
machinery company reported initial difficulty in conveying
company standards and measurement methods. Another company
had difficulty in establishing an understanding of the
requirement as it pertained to quality control and testing.
Even when specifications were understood by the foreign
producer, one aircraft company had difficulty introducing
government-generated changes. In fairness to the foreign
supplier, such problems also occur with U.S. sources.
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Oral communication also created problems for the
respondents . A few companies hired brokers who were
familiar with the language and business practices of the
foreign country. This facilitated early contact between
the two companies. Most companies solved their communica-
tion problems within the first eighteen months and reported
good working relationships thereafter.
A manufacturer of electronic componentry cautioned
against differing manufacturing practices from country
to country. Even though a final product from two different
sources may be called the same thing, the performance
characteristics may be vastly different. In Japan, for
example, a die block is a case-hardened chunk of carbon
steel. In the United States, a die block is forged alloy.
The major problem still facing some of the companies
surveyed is beyond the total control of either the supplier
or customer. This centers around the problem of pricing
stability. In Europe, a "price indexing" or "price in effect
at the time of shipment" system is popular. It is not
acceptable, however, to U.S. businesses when government
fixed-price contracts are being executed. With increased
acquisition of defense articles overseas, this problem may
be more difficult for U.S. businesses to overcome. In
Australia, some U.S. companies have overcome the problem by
insisting on firm prices when the contract is negotiated.





The United States government and private industry
expend many dollars and hours of training to develop highly
skilled negotiators. Even when both negotiating teams are
from the same culture, speak the same language and follow
the same business practices, the successful conduct of
negotiations is an art. The replacement of an American by
a representative of a foreign company as one of the parties
in a negotiation could severely complicate the task. The
companies surveyed were asked to relate the negotiating
peculiarities they had encountered when doing business with
overseas companies.
Communication was again cited by some companies as
a major problem in negotiating with foreign businesses.
As discussed earlier, the interpretation of terms and phrases
used in specifications caused several problems in pre-
negotiation preparations. The problem was compounded by
additional delay encountered in responding by mail to ques-
tions raised by the overseas company. An exchange of letters
which would take no more than two weeks in the United States
could take over one month via international mail service.
Misunderstandings between negotiating parties were
much more easily overcome in face-to-face encounters.
Respondents reported that, with competent interpreters in
attendance and with additional care exercised to ensure that
the representatives of the foreign companies thoroughly
understood the phraseology in the documentation, most
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communication problems disappeared. The problem then
became understanding the peculiarities in business practices
and local customs. A manufacturer of electronic components
reported that, in doing business with the Japanese, nego-
tiators must be prepared to work with decisions which were
made by committee, not by an individual. Also, the company
reported that their negotiators had difficulty due to the
reluctance of many Orientals to say no or to give any answer
at all when all members of the team could not agree.
Respondents to the survey stressed the need to change
negotiating strategies based on the nationality with which
negotiations were being conducted. One company reported
that the price was generally flexible when negotiating with
a Japanese company, while it was inflexible in negotiations
with German companies. A manufacturer of heavy construction
equipment responded that negotiations differed depending on
whether the company was from a developed or developing nation.
For developed nations, the company saw little difference than
negotiating with U.S. suppliers. In the case of developing
nations, particularly those countries where the U.S. firm
was considering local purchases as a means to gain sales
entry into the country, difficulty was encountered in estab-
lishing a competitive position with other suppliers worldwide.
For example, one South American country compelled the respon-
dent to develop sources of supply within that country, even
though they were not competitive with suppliers in other
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countries. Another company reported that to successfully
negotiate with Russia or East Germany, the final agreement
must fit into the established economic plans of those
countries
.
The impediments to successful negotiation are not
all on the non-U. S. side of the table. American represen-
tatives to negotiations have caused several companies
"embarrassment" of both a financial and a political nature.
One respondent discussed early difficulties his firm had
caused by not authorizing its representatives to make key
decisions. This caused negotiations to be drawn out while
the U.S. negotiators communicated with the home office.
Some other negotiating peculiarities reported by
respondents to the survey included the following:
— The price quoted by some foreign suppliers
is a firm fixed-price and is not subject to
changes without concessions in specifications,
delivery or some other factor.
— Firm prices are not offered for more than a
one year period.
— Some foreign sources consider it a privilege
to allow U.S. companies to do buisness with
them. Consequently, they develop very opin-
ionated positions.
— "Metric" measurement inconsistency in specifica-
tions and units of measurement.
— Currency fluctuations are a continual headache.
— Orders cannot be rescheduled without added costs.
— Concern over stability of employment, even at




The question of whether or not an overseas company
can be depended upon to provide sole source support for a
component caused the greatest divergence of opinion of all
the questions asked in the survey. With appropriate quali-
fications to their answers, the respondents essentially
were equally divided on this question.
A manufacturer of pumps and water systems expressed
his reaction to foreign sole source support as follows:
We would, under no circumstances, be totally
dependent on a foreign source of supply.
For every item that we import, we either
have duplicate tooling or an alternate
process available domestically. The vagaries
of the international political situation
and longer lines of supply are too risky for
sole source dependence.
None of the respondents expressed total support for
an overseas sole sourcing policy. Good business practices
preclude the reliance on a single source, whether foreign
or domestic. The risk of customer dissatisfaction is too
great to adopt a sole sourcing policy. One company estab-
lished a U.S. source for any component purchased overseas.
Conversely, they did not hesitate to establish a foreign
source if they were in a domestic sole source situation.
Several companies supported sole sourcing overseas
with certain qualifications. A manufacturer of electronic
components stated that some, but not all, overseas sole
source companies can be depended upon. To guard against a
permanent sole source situation, the U.S. company can
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(.1) increase protective inventories, (2) re-design,
(3) multiple source and/or (4) reach agreement with a
foreign source to establish a licensing arrangement with
a U.S. source.
Several respondents recommended the establishment
of larger inventories as an insurance against supply dis-
ruptions from an overseas sole source supplier. This policy
is not without cost! More money must be tied up in inventory
and, for short term obsolescent items, the company may end
up with worthless stock on its shelves.
A sole source policy was defended in several situa-
tions. If a product is only available overseas, sole
sourcing may be the only alternative. One company reported
that, when the tooling costs are extremely high, they do
depend on single foreign sourcing.
6
. Foreign Technology
The United States has enjoyed a reputation as the
world leader in technological advances. This leadership
position has perpetuated the "not invented here" syndrome
among many Americans. The survey asked whether foreign
companies can provide technology superior to that available
from U.S. companies.
Only five respondents provided a negative response
to this question. One of the companies qualified their
answer by stating that their response of inferior technology
overseas was based only on the commodities used by their
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firm. They did not comment on other commodities which
might, in fact, represent superior technology from foreign
sources
.
The rather surprising results from this question
were that most of the companies surveyed recognized that
superior technology was available overseas. The products
cited for technology excellence ranged over a wide spectrum
of commodities. Respondents identified countries in both
Europe and the Orient which had the reputation for tech-
nological excellence in certain areas.
Two companies qualified their responses to the
question by pointing out that many foreign companies gain
the reputation as superior technology manufacturers by
producing products of superior quality consistency. Metal
castings were specifically cited by both companies. The
experience of the respondents revealed that the foreign
sources they purchased castings from had excellent quality
assurance programs and utilized methods to insure quality
integrity that were often superior to methods used by
domestic suppliers.
A manufacturer of construction equipment provided
the following comments regarding its experiences with
superior technology overseas:
"There are many suppliers outside the U.S.
who have achieved levels of technology that
are superior to those in the U.S. We have
technical agreements with several companies
and rely on their technical contribution
in developing components for our products.
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A good example is pistons in the U.S. A
very limited knowledge exists on the
technology of piston design. We rely
heavily on German piston designers for
this technology."
The practice of many Japanese companies to hire only
engineering graduates was cited by one respondent as a
reason for superior Japanese technology. The companies
place these graduates in all departments of the company,
not just engineering or quality assurance. The respondent
felt that this practice was one of the major reasons behind
the stunning successes of many Japanese firms.
Some of the superior technology areas cited by the
respondents as available overseas were as follows:
— consumer electronics
— machining (close tolerance)
— aerospace componentry
— metallurgy (particularly high alloys and inlay
procedures)
— metalworking and metalforming
— high test concrete
— ceramic tubing
— instruments (e.g., tachometers)
— fuel injection systems
— electrical assemblies (e.g., alternators)
7 . Foreign Costs
Although most companies did not specify cheaper prices
as the prime reason for buying from overseas companies, the
survey asked about their experiences with overseas costs.
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The question was divided into two categories, labor intensive
items and capital intensive items.
The general consensus on all foreign costs was that
they were rising. Due to the fluctuation of the U.S. dollar
in the world marketplace and inflation, most of the rela-
tively cheaper labor available in Europe several years ago
had all but disappeared. Most respondents reported that
labor intensive costs were still lower in the developing
countries, particularly Korea, Mexico, Taiwan and Singapore.
One aircraft company responded that these costs were stable
in the short run, but that currency changes, inflation and
unstable labor situations were causing increasing costs in
the long run.
Most respondents agreed that capital intensive
costs overseas were generally competitive with U.S. costs.
Several companies gave the edge to Germany, Japan and
Sweden in preferential capital intensive costs. This
response was probably motivated as much by the consistent
superior high quality of many of their products, particu-
larly metal products, as it was by the actual cost of the
commodities themselves.
8 . Other Foreign Purchasing Experiences
Several companies related other experiences in doing
business overseas which they considered noteworthy. One
company stressed that all negotiations should be conducted
in English, regardless of the U.S. company negotiator's
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familiarity with a foreign language. Care should be exer-
cised to eliminate slang, colloquialisms and jargon in
these negotiations. Another company advised that, if an
interpreter were used, the American party must be cautioned
to be straightforward and speak slowly.
Business customs and traditions of the host country
were emphasized. One respondent advised that, prior to
negotiations, the business customs and traditions should be
studied and understood. The strategy used in negotiations
varies from country to country. An aircraft manufacturer
stressed that the English were very status conscious, while
the French and Japanese have social customs that are part
of doing business and which may appear to be a waste of
time to Americans . Another respondent emphasized that to
effectively do business with the Japanese, the American
negotiator must be a good listener. On the other side of
the world, this company recommended using a strong speaker
when dealing with the West Germans
.
A manufacturer of electrical equipment replied that
it is more difficult to locate a qualified supplier in
another country than in the United States. Once a foreign
supplier is accepted, business is usually conducted as in
this country, except that longer material transit times can
be expected.
One respondent stated that the company had had no
unsuccessful foreign procurements. The company lamented,
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however, that the major problem was U.S. customs. As a
taxpayer, the respondent had no complaints with customs.
As a businessman, the forms and suspicions of customs
inspectors "drove him 'bananas'."
Another respondent summarized the future of his
company in overseas buying as follows:
Although we intend to proceed cautiously,
we will be increasing our utilization of
foreign supply sources in the next few
years.
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IMPLICATIONS
Foreign purchasing appears to be a well-established
practice in most American companies. Their experiences
should be valuable to the Department of Defense as it
expands foreign defense article acquisition.
The DOD project manager, however, operates under laws
and regulations which complicate entry into the foreign
marketplace. Although NATO RSI policy facilitates access
to foreign defense articles, the project manager must con-
tinue to exercise the same controls, such as testing and
quality assurance procedures, as in a domestic acquisition.
The experiences of private industry do apply to the Depart-






Research for this thesis revealed a wide spectrum of
opinions and experiences in doing business with overseas
companies. The task of expanding to foreign sources of
supply, whether motivated by government policy or company
economics, is certainly not an easy one. The DOD project
manager must somehow find adequate time and resources to
add NATO RSI requirements to his already overcrowded list
of responsibilities. In private industry, purchasing managers
must overcome some inertia from within their companies to
take advantage of the economies that foreign acquisition
offer.
Private industry has been active in the international
marketplace for many years . Survey responses indicated that
many of the same problems being encountered within Depart-
ment of Defense activities today also were evident in private
industry when foreign sources were first evaluated. Although
the tasks of government and industry differ in many respects,
the lessons learned from private industry can be selectively
applied in overcoming internal DOD resistance. This resis-
tance manifests itself in four major areas of concern:
foreign product quality; adequacy of foreign technology;
timeliness of foreign suppliers in meeting shipment schedules
and the dependability of foreign sources to meet continuing
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needs. A review of how private industry overcame resis-
tance in each of these areas should provide some helpful
insights to the DOD project manager in implementing NATO
RSI policy.
B. FOREIGN PRODUCT QUALITY
The belief that foreign-produced products are generally
inferior to U.S. products manifested itself in many of the
personal interviews and survey responses from government
and industry. In most cases, government representatives
based their responses on perceptions of the quality avail-
able overseas. Few DOD project management personnel had
sufficient experience to form firm convictions regarding
foreign product quality.
Purchasing personnel in private industry had encountered
considerable resistance from within their organizations when
foreign components were first being considered for use in
company products. Most of the resistance was from engin-
eering and quality assurance personnel who had the responsi-
bility to ensure that the final product met company standards
This resistance was overcome in a very convincing manner.
The personnel in these departments were allowed to perform
the same tests on foreign products as they did on domestic
products prior to acceptance by the company of the foreign
components. They discovered that, in most cases, these




As the Department of Defense becomes more involved in
purchasing systems, subsystems and components overseas, it
is imperative that an adequate testing program be utilized
to ensure that foreign products do meet government specifi-
cations. This may be an easier program for DOD to initiate
than it was for private industry. Facilities and organiza-
tions such as the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River,
Maryland, and the Operational Test and Evaluation Force are
already in existence to perform testing functions in this
country. Some resistance may be experienced in establishing
on-site quality assurance functions in foreign companies
due to the differences in overseas business practices. With
the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency organizing quality




The general perception of most personnel interviewed
within DOD organizations was that foreign technology was
inferior to U.S. technology. The belief that the United
States was advancing the state-of-the-art in most warfare
areas offered little incentive for these respondents to
investigate foreign technology. In many cases, it was felt
that the U.S. would be the loser in cooperative research and
development projects. The United States' superior technology
would be provided to allied governments, with little new
technology available in return.
64

Private industry reported that, on the contrary, there
were several areas of superior technology overseas. Experi-
ence had shown that modern manufacturing processes, par-
ticularly in Europe, were capable of producing selected
items that were superior to domestic products. In addition,
overseas manufacturers frequently exhibited the capability
to perform high quality workmanship on a more consistent
basis.
The Department of Defense should be able to identify
the areas of overseas technological excellence through the
testing process discussed in the previous section. If
project offices are evaluating foreign weapons systems in
accordance with DOD Directive 2010.6 during the normal
acquisition process, areas of superior foreign technology
should also be identified. It is recommended that project
managers take advantage of the experiences of private indus-
try, where applicable, in evaluating overseas technology.
The "not invented here" syndrome will have less influence
on future DOD acquisitions when the capabilities of foreign
industry are placed in the proper perspective.
D. TIMELINESS OF FOREIGN DELIVERIES
The ability of foreign suppliers to meet delivery
schedules required by DOD project offices was investigated
in some depth. Most DOD respondents felt that foreign
companies, with proper controls, could be held to the same
standards required of U.S. companies.
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Private industry experience has been generally good
in this area. Since the receipt of critical components could
be even more crucial to the successful operation of a pro-
duction line, many private companies adopted a practice
of increasing the inventory depth of several foreign pro-
duced components to insure against costly stockouts. In
addition, to reduce excessive inventories, many companies
encouraged overseas suppliers to establish distribution
centers in the United States for their products.
The DOD project manager should ensure that potential
foreign suppliers are aware of the critical delivery
requirements in government contracts and require these
firms to demonstrate their capabilities to meet schedule
commitments. An emergency plan to provide critical compon-
ents when the normal transportation method is disrupted
would also be advisable. In evaluating overseas companies,
project offices should solicit the experiences of domestic
companies with these same foreign sources of supply.
E. DEPENDABILITY OF FOREIGN SOURCES
Both DOD and private industry respondents expressed
concern that overseas businesses may become sole sources
of supply for certain equipments and components. Licensing
agreements with United States companies have been utilized
to develop alternate sources for components used on foreign
weapon systems in the U.S. inventory. This practice, however,
does not necessarily coincide with either the family of
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weapons concept or the "two-way street" planned for NATO
nations.
Private industry generally does not depend on sole-
source suppliers in either the foreign or domestic market-
place. Increased inventories, licensing arrangements and
product redesign are utilized to reduce or eliminate this
dependence. Certain situations were cited, however, where
excessive tooling costs and unique capabilities made overseas
sole sourcing the only practical alternative.
Department of Defense project managers should tailor
acquisition strategies based on the type of equipment being
purchased from overseas sources. If an item is "off the
shelf" or a stand-alone type equipment (e.g., truck, tank,
etc.), a sole-source dependency situation may be feasible.
This is the type of equipment visualized to be included in
future family-of-weapons programs. Past experiences of
government and private industry have shown that foreign
sources generally can be depended upon to support their
equipments adequately. Equipments, however, which have a
large interdependence on other equipment in the U.S. inven-
tory (e.g., communication equipment) should be considered
for acquisition from multiple sources.
F. "TWO-WAY STREET"
The DOD project manager must not lose sight of the fact
that transactions with foreign governments and companies are
two-way in nature. The successful application of defense
67

regulations to a domestic acquisition is a significant
challenge to any project manager. When the same project
manager must expand his horizons to include the overseas
marketplace, the entire spectrum of acquisition regulations
must be re-examined to ensure its compatibility with
foreign business practices.
Mr. Teck Wilson, the president of Teledyne Ryan Aero-
nautical, provided the following perception of a foreign
businessman doing business with the U.S. government for
the first time. He stated:
...Beyond this, doing business with the
U.S., at least for the first time, is a
Kafkaesque experience. Only our [U.S.]
procedures, specifications, processes,
tests, formats, controls, etc., are
acceptable; our auditors wish to know
things even their company controller
may not; competition is next to
godliness; the customer is an adversary,
not a partner. And, if he [the foreign
businessman] does not understand our
English, we will speak louder. [16:215]
Success in international acquisition requires the
cooperation and understanding of both the U.S. and foreign
representatives. The path to successful acquisitions may
not be smooth, but the results should be technically





1. DOD Directive 2010.6 requires military departments
to consider NATO standardization and interoperability
objectives in all development, procurement and product
improvement activities. What is being done in your project
to implement this directive?
2. Private industry has had considerable success in the
foreign marketplace. Do you feel that DOD (and the U.S.
Navy) can acquire foreign systems for our own use which meet
the cost, schedule and performance criteria we require?
Why?
3. What is the user community in DOD which will exhibit
the most resistance to procurement of foreign systems?
What will be their major objections?
4. Can the U.S. Navy successfully support a foreign system
which requires parts support from an overseas business
source? Must a U.S. source of supply be developed to ensure
proper support?
5. What is your perception of the ability of overseas
manufacturers to meet their performance "claims"? Who
should monitor these manufacturers?
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6. The DOD RSI directive emphasizes cooperative or
interdependent R&D programs between the U.S. and allied
nations . Is there a possibility (or was there a possi-
bility earlier in your program) to take advantage of
foreign R&D efforts in designing your weapon system Cor
major components of the system)
?
7. What would be the reaction of your prime contractor to
subcontracting with overseas companies?
8. European manufacturing costs are usually higher. If
direct sales to European countries can be increased by
producing a certain percentage of the system components in
these countries, can the higher costs be justified?
9. Do you feel that Congressional pressure from constituents






1. Does your company consider purchase of components from
overseas businesses? What are the prime considerations in
buying (or not buying) from foreign sources?
2. What departments within your organization expressed the
most resistance to offshore procurement? If you are now
buying foreign components, how did you overcome the resistance
within your organization?
3. What were your early experiences (first 18 months) in
buying from a foreign source? Later experiences with this
source?
4. Have you experienced difficulty in negotiating with
overseas companies? (Describe some of the negotiating
peculiarities you have encountered.)
5
.
Can an overseas company be depended upon to provide
sole source support for a component? If not, what do you
do to ensure support of your components of foreign origin?
6. Can foreign companies provide technology superior to
that available from U.S. companies? If so, what areas of
technology excellence are available overseas?
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7. What has been your experience with overseas costs?
a. For labor intensive items?
b. For capital intensive items?
8. Do you have any other experiences in doing business
overseas which you feel are noteworthy (e.g., language,
business practices, customs, etc.) and which you are willing
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